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Symposium: “Provided that this lasts…”/Colloque « Pourvu que ça dure…»
Twenty Theses on Politics and Subjectivity
Bruno Bosteels
ABstract: In French theory and beyond, the shift between structuralism and poststructuralism marks 
a pivotal turning point in the broader process of  problematizing the question of  political subjectivity. 
Two dominant trends can be distinguished in this context: one still connected to Marxism and the 
dialectic, for which politics is inseparable from a process of  subjectivization; and the other very much 
aimed against the Hegelo-Marxist dialectic in the name of  difference, for which the subject remains 
irreparably metaphysical.  If  in the latter tendency, associated with the legacy of  Heidegger’s thinking, 
the most we obtain is an intimation of  an ontology of  “being-with” as the basis for an inoperative “com-
munity,” then in the former tendency, associated with the legacy of  Althusser’s canonical works, the 
argument in favor of  the political subject is frequently formulated in terms of  a plea in favor of  main-
taining the category of  “the people.”  The problem with this new consensus, however, is that the result-
ing theory of  the subject, articulated onto the gap or incompleteness of  the structure, has once again 
become ontologized as a new law.  More so than a reshuffling of  the familiar deck of  philosophical 
cards, the current impasse in the theory of  politics and subjectivity requires a two-fold historicization. 
Not only should we expand on the notion of  “historical modes of  politics,” but, in addition, we should 
also historicize the different “theories of  the subject,” in the plural, from which the new post-Hegelian 
consensus has been able to emerge uncontested by consolidating itself  as if  it were the only theory of  
the subject that ever existed.
Keywords:  subjectivization, deconstruction, poststructuralism, metaphysics, community, ontology, the 
people





Political theory today faces a double challenge.  On the one hand, even the most radical 
political theories hopelessly seem to lag behind the variety, intensity, and mobility of  recent 
political practices.  From riots and occupations on the fringes of  so-called civil society to scat-
tered attempts to reenergize a parliamentary left via the electoral route toward integral or 
even just partial state control, there is certainly no shortage of  events that beg to be analyzed 
in terms of  their possible contributions to the worldwide theorization of  the present moment, 
for instance, in terms of  the role of  organization, the function of  the state, the place of  his-
tory, the critique of  political economy, and so on.  Many theorists, however, seem to have 
great difficulty overcoming the deeply ingrained impulse merely to retrofit a selection of  
events grabbed from the headlines–some more reformist and unapologetically or reluctantly 
state-oriented, others more anarchist-libertarian and quietly or rabidly anti-statist–into so 
many instantiations or illustrations of  their own independently conceived theories.  On the 
other hand, posing a second challenge to contemporary political theory, the shortcomings of  
some of  these recent political experiments are often equated with, if  not actually attributed 
to, the shortcomings of  contemporary theories or philosophies.  Perhaps this is just one more 
example of  theoretical arrogance parading in the guise of  self-critical modesty.  No longer 
able to keep up with the speed of  current events, let alone anticipate and guide them from 
above, many theorists nowadays prefer to wallow in the sorry predicament in which at least 
current practices show up the weaknesses and blind spots of  our prevailing theories.  There 
is no real threat to intellectual authority when this or that philosopher is reproached for nor 
having the conceptual tools and wherewithal to understand the promise of  this or that riot. 
For such a reproach after all still conveniently confirms–by way of  negation or by default–
the need for all radical practice to be oriented by the correct theory.  Theorists still win even 
when they lose out in the face of  ongoing practices.
2
This situation is further compounded by the fact that the relation between theory and 
practice, far from offering a ready-made answer, is very much part and parcel of  the current 
impasse of  all orthodoxy.  There exists a broad consensus today that political practices can 
no longer be viewed–if  they ever could–as the application or derivation of  prior theories or 
programs.  Even the view of  revolutionary politics as entailing the much longed-for fusion of  
theory and practice–a fusion for which the technical term of  praxis was coined or borrowed 
from Greek philosophy–has come under attack as stemming from a much longer tradition 
of  Western metaphysical thought, of  which the idea of  a dialectical synthesis would be the 
crowning moment rather than a radical critique.  Marxism, especially, in its debts to the 
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Hegelian dialectic (debts that possibly extend well beyond the moment of  the “epistemologi-
cal break” between the work of  the so-called young and the mature Marx), would not come 
unscathed out of  these attacks, with the result being that theory and practice are left dang-
ling, forever disjointed in their blind or dogmatic autonomy, except for brief  and intermit-
tent, mostly short-lived messianic flashes of  redemption in what can then only be called an 
emptied-out or deactivated praxis: a praxis that has been rendered inoperative, or a praxis 
without practice.  Finally, even the notion of  theory as being immanent to the movement 
rather than imported from the outside, which is a notion quite common among a large num-
ber of  today’s activists–whether they self-describe as anarcho-communists, autonomists, or 
accelerationists–is perhaps only the latest avatar of  the millenarian dream of  a coincidence 
between theory and practice realized in the actual unfolding of  events themselves.  But this 
dream can hardly withstand the critique or deconstruction of  Western metaphysics, a cri-
tique or deconstruction for which the legacy of  metaphysics shows two faces or tendencies: 
on the one hand, the tendency to view theory (as first philosophy or ontology) as prior and 
transcendent to practice (as ethics or politics); and, on the other hand, the tendency to search 
for the fusion (synthesis or coincidence) of  theory and practice in the (dialectical or pantheist) 
immanence of  praxis.
3
The problem of  how to name the subjects and events of  today’s politics should be placed 
against the backdrop of  this larger impasse.  The difficulty of  nomination is merely an index 
of  the absence of  self-evident dialectical links, first, between theory and practice; second, 
between politics and history; and, third, between history and ontology.  To be exact, with 
the critique of  dialectics as part of  the critique or deconstruction of  metaphysics, the rela-
tion between politics and history falls apart no less than the relation between theory and 
practice.  This means that politics is seen as no longer being grounded in or deduced from–if  
it ever was–historical factors in the broadest sense, including elements of  the social and the 
economical.  If  “people,” “nation,” “civil society,” “proletariat,” “plebes” or even “multitude” 
no longer seem to fit today’s actors as the glove that these names once seemed to offer, this 
is in large part because the origin of  a genuine political event is henceforth associated with 
an inevitable gap between an actor and its naturally or objectively assigned role in society, a 
discrepancy between a subject and its place in the economic structure, or an internal scission 
that separates any political subject from itself.  Unfortunately, though, such an understand-
ing of  the gap, discrepancy or scission at the source of  any genuine political event (today or 
always?  that is precisely part of  the question that becomes obliterated in the process), in its 
most radical version, becomes re-ontologized in the sense that the separation or intransitivity 
between politics and history, just like the distance between theory and practice, is referred 
BRUNO BOSTEELS
24
back to the supposedly more fundamental gap between the ontic (now including every realm 
of  politics, history, society, and so on) and the ontological (philosophy as the thinking of  
being as such).  The brief  attempt to translate the so-called ontological difference into the 
difference between “politics” and “the political” is only one version of  this ontologization. 
But this makes it impossible to interrogate the historical reasons for why certain names or 
modes of  political subjectivization might have worked at certain times, for example the class 
politics of  party and unions, whereas nowadays these names or modes supposedly would 
have become inoperative.  In fact, more often than not, the conclusion insinuates itself  that all 
hitherto existing forms of  politics–even, if  not especially, all Marxist-inspired revolutionary 
politics–have remained blind to the inevitable gap, discrepancy or dehiscence that always 
already unhinges any political subject from its objective function in history or society.  At its 
most extreme, this anti-historicist and anti-essentialist insight, which derives its credentials 
from a radical rethinking of  historicity or historicality in the wake of  Heidegger’s destruc-
tion of  metaphysics, supposes the abandonment of  the category of  the subject altogether–
whether political or otherwise.
4
Paradoxically, the radical deconstruction of  the category of  the subject as the very cul-
mination of  Western metaphysics (a culmination that is at the same time the beginning of  the 
end of  metaphysics embodied in the Nietzschean will to power, which Heidegger interprets 
as the sovereign will to will) affects most but not all names of  political subjectivity.  “People,” 
“nation,” “state,” or “proletariat” certainly succumb to the critique of  metaphysical subjectiv-
ity, and so do even the “soviets” of  so-called council communism, which once upon a time, 
during the process of  de-Stalinization after 1956 and again with renewed energy after 1968, 
if  not also today with the revival of  various autonomist or anarcho-communist tendencies, 
were expected to offer a self-managed alternative to totalitarian bureaucracy.  However, the 
same critique does not seem to apply to the notion of  “community.”  For a brief  while, start-
ing in the 1980s, a radical deconstructive rethinking of  community was undertaken to show 
that a community worthy of  this name is, or ought to be, without the underlying unity of  an 
essential identity and that what is, or ought to be, shared in a community amounts to noth-
ing–except, precisely, the absence of  a common essence.  Is, or ought to be?  Much depends 
on this ambivalence.  And while the ontologizing tendency typical of  deconstruction as a 
whole clearly favors the peremptory use of  affirmations in the present indicative, it is equally 
clear that the various arguments about the inoperative, finite or singular-plural nature of  
the community all depend on the implicit normativity of  an imperative ought-to-be, without 
which the worst forms of  really existing communitarianism–whether national-socialist or 
even communist–could not be kept at bay.  In other words, whenever we read assertions 
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from the hand of  Jean-Luc Nancy or Giorgio Agamben about what the community (in French 
or Italian, the use of  the definite article, while seemingly neutral, can always be read as 
emphatic in this way, whereas the English translations are frequently able to do without the 
article altogether) “is,” namely, without substance, essence or stable underlying identity, we 
must understand that this is so in principle but not always in actual fact, since such is obvi-
ously not the way in which Nazism or Stalinism–the main ideological forms being targeted in 
these philosophical reflections–put to work their idea of  the community.
5
To the ontological register thus is assigned the formidable task of  having to translate a 
historical critique of  the present in philosophical terms, while at the same time interrupting 
the possibility of  establishing a genuine two-way link between history and ontology.  To be 
more precise, really existing history, which in this context can be summed up in the standard 
twin versions of  totalitarianism named by the proper names of  Hitler and Stalin, always falls 
short of  the ontological dignity of  the concept of  “the” community, which can be shorn of  
all that cumbersome ballast so as to be affirmed as what it is, when in actual fact this is how 
things ought to be.  But this leaves the reader with the impression that no existing commu-
nity ever manages to be what the philosophers so boldly and confidently stipulate, not even 
under the juridical protection of  regimes of  representative democracy that alone would be 
capable of  staving off  the threats of  totalitarianism.  At most, in this reimagining of  the com-
munity, there will be flashes of  anticipation to tease out what otherwise is merely affirmed in 
the present indicative: scattered experiments selectively but also predictably pulled from the 
headlines–an art work here or a street riot there–in which perhaps we catch a glimpse of  our 
fundamental condition as mortal human beings exposed to a pure “being-with,” or to a pure 
“being-in-common,” without substance and without essence.  Finally, because of  the way in 
which the disastrous experiences of  the twentieth century thus receive a diagnostic written 
in a radically ontological key, based on the recognition that such experiences violently dis-
avow the kernel of  finitude at the heart of  “the” community, this aspect of  the deconstruction 
of  politics by the same token also seems to render impossible, if  not wholly undesirable, the 
actual putting into work of  any future sense of  the collective subject, least of  all one based on 
such notions as work, labor or operativity, which are now considered hopelessly metaphysi-
cal.  And yet, this does not keep some of  these very same thinkers of  the community from 
invoking the notion of  a certain communism.  “This is why,” Nancy writes at the start of  
The Inoperative Community, ambiguously referring to a well-known dictum from Jean-Paul 
Sartre (according to whom it was Marxism that constituted the unsurpassable horizon of  our 
time), “even as we posit that communism is no longer our unsurpassable horizon, we must 
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also posit, just as forcefully, that a communist exigency or demand communicates with the 
gesture by means of  which we must go farther than all possible horizons.”1
6
As it turned out, this seemingly scholastic dispute over the metaphysical nature of  the 
Marxist dialectic was to have enormous impact on the political and theoretical history of  the 
Left.  To be exact, as a result of  this dispute an already incredibly varied socialist and com-
munist Left would be drawn into a overly philosophical arena where it would soon lose its 
main features as a political project altogether.  In what could well be the greatest conjuring 
trick of  the twentieth century at the level of  political thought, the reassessment of  the history 
of  the socialist and communist Left (from Marx and Bakunin by way of  Lenin, Luxemburg 
and Trotsky all the way to Stalin, Mao, Castro and Ho-Chi-Minh—though with precious few 
of  these last figures being mentioned by name, let alone studied with the same textual zeal 
as, say, Husserl or Heidegger), is now recast and presented as being part and parcel of  the 
millenarian struggle against the metaphysical oblivion of  being.  Conversely, avid readers of  
Heidegger’s lectures and seminars on the history of  metaphysics, even the recently published 
“black notebooks,” can thenceforth present themselves as the urgently needed harbingers of  
a post-metaphysical Left.  Thus, giving rise to a self-described “left Heideggerianism” and 
pleading for a “radical democracy,” if  not for a “democracy-to-come,” the philosophies of  
difference allow newer generations of  thinkers to reassess the failings and shortcomings of  
all past political movements, state formations, and popular uprisings in light of  the critique 
or deconstruction of  metaphysics.  All?  Well, yes: insofar as what is at stake is the very 
ground on which political questions are raised in the first place, no concrete fact or example 
of  politics can ever hope to evade the all-embracing sweep of  the critique of  metaphysics, of  
sovereignty, or of  hegemony.  For the critique in question, moreover, these last three terms are 
roughly equivalent and can be used almost interchangeably; whoever says post-metaphysical 
thus implies post-sovereign and post-hegemonic at the same time.  From Plato to NATO, as 
the popular rhyme goes, is hardly a caricature to describe the full range of  options over which 
this critique casts its worldwide net of  deconstructive suspicion.  More surprising is the fact 
that such suspicions are applied with even greater fervor to the Left than to the Right.  Thus, 
by presenting themselves as the guardians of  a never-ending vigilance with regard to the 
metaphysical temptations built into every effort at self-emancipation, whether by an indi-
vidual or by the people, by the proletariat or by the multitude, proponents of  the deconstruc-
tion of  metaphysics can always position themselves as standing to the left of  the official Left. 
 1 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, trans. Peter Connor (Minneapolis: University of  
Minnesota Press, 1991), 8–9 (trans. modified).
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Last but certainly not least, also giving rise to various so-called new materialisms, the phi-
losophers of  difference and their contemporary heirs can always claim to be more radically 
materialist than all the old materialisms having come before them.  And, foremost among the 
latter, we should always assume the shadowy presence of  a certain (dialectical and historical) 
materialism—now considered irreparably idealist and metaphysical—attributed to Marx.
7
The complete debunking of  the very notion of  political subjectivity is not the only 
outcome of  the current theoretical impasse.  Even if  we limit ourselves to so-called French 
theory, aside from the Heideggerian tradition in the deconstruction of  metaphysics found 
among disciples of  Jacques Derrida, we can find a number of  thinkers–among them Alain 
Badiou, Jacques Rancière and Étienne Balibar–who all maintain the notion of  subjectiviza-
tion as essential to politics and who paradoxically are associated with the teachings of  Louis 
Althusser.  This is paradoxical because for Althusser, no less than for Heidegger, the cat-
egory of  the subject is inherently suspect: not as much metaphysical so much as ideological, 
the subject is never on the side of  truth, whether scientific, political, or otherwise.  Contrary 
to this rejection of  the subject found in Althusser’s canonical texts, the difficult task faced by 
his students in the midst of  the crisis of  Marxism–a crisis often referred to as the moment 
of  the emergence of  post-Marxism–consists in having to articulate a theory of  the subject 
that nevertheless would be compatible with the deconstruction of  metaphysics.  This means 
that deconstruction cannot go all the way down or, rather, that deconstruction is impossible 
without at least some notion of  the intervening subject.  Between the two intellectual tradi-
tions marked by the names of  Heidegger and Althusser and their disciples, there exists both 
and at the same time an essential compatibility (which we can sum up as the need for the 
deconstruction of  the One) as well as an essential incompatibility (which we can sum up in 
terms of  the abandonment or maintenance of  a minimal theory of  the subject).
8
One area where this debate plays itself  out is in relation to the above-mentioned rela-
tion between politics and history.  For thinkers such as Badiou or Rancière, politics, which 
is always the work of  a subject, can no longer be referred to the objective data of  history, 
sociology or political economy.  This “no longer” can be interpreted in two ways: either what 
once was historically feasible has now run its course and is no longer available as a practical 
option, or else it is only a misguided theoretical tradition that saw the class struggles from 
the past as deriving directly from the socio-economic realities of  their time.  In other words, 
either Marx has in fact become obsolete, even though his vision of  the class struggle was 
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once historically correct, or else he was always right in theory, even though his insights in the 
contingent character of  the class struggle were subsequently buried under a deterministic 
essentialism in the tradition of  orthodox Marxism.
9
The shared premise behind all post-Marxism thus consists in taking into account the gap 
between politics and history, understood in a sense that is broad enough to encompass the 
relations between politics and society or between politics and economics.  Badiou’s trajectory 
is exemplary in this sense, insofar as over the course of  two or three decades, he has increas-
ingly come to disjoin the analytical from the political role of  Marxism.  As a diagnostic, 
Marx’s critique of  political economy may well be more valid today than ever, but this does not 
help the militant actors in the political uprisings of  our time to devise the appropriate tactics 
and strategies for intervention.  Something has entered into a profound crisis in the articula-
tion between these two aspects or logics of  Marxism, which I have called the analytical and 
the political and which other interpreters of  Marx such as Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval 
call the logic of  capital and the logic of  the class struggle, supposedly marked by an incom-
mensurability overcome only by the imaginary glue of  communism: “Communism is what 
serves as ‘glue’ to hold together two lines of  thought that have very different histories: the 
‘objective’ logic of  capitalism and the ‘practical’ logic of  the civil war between classes would 
converge into a superior social and economic form of  organization.  In other terms, only an 
imaginary projection of  the future would soldier together the disparate nature of  these two 
perspectives.”2  As for Badiou, even he is less and less convinced that we can understand 
politics, like the development of  religion, “through history, in and with history,” as the early 
Marx said in The Holy Family, in a phrase often repeated by the late Daniel Bensaïd.  This 
is because for the author of  Being and Event politics is entirely on the order of  the event, 
which cannot be understood unless we put to the side all mere facts and opinions about facts. 
Thus, Badiou increasingly will come to see political interventions—just like art, mathematics 
and love as the other three domains in which events can take place—as self-referential and 
authorized only by themselves.  This is especially clear in the period from the late 1980s to the 
mid-1990s, roughly from Being and Event to Metapolitics, when the anti-historicist and anti-
dialectical impetus of  Badiou’s work effectively is at its peak.  But many commentators are 
suspicious of  the anti-historicist tendency in later works as well and perceive a similar stance 
in the proposed return to the Idea of  communism in The Communist Hypothesis and The 
Rebirth of  History.  The potential drawbacks rightly or wrongly associated with this position 
should be obvious enough: a seemingly ethereal aloofness, a privileging of  the philosopher-
 2 Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval, Marx, prénom Karl (Paris: Gallimard, 2012), 11.
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intellectual to the detriment of  the masses in revolt, and in general a separation of  praxis 
and Idea under the openly accepted philosophical guardianship of  Plato rather than Marx. 
Conversely, the potential risks involved in the opposite position should be no less evident: 
an anti-intellectual disdain for theory in favor of  the pedagogy of  the deed, a tendency to 
explain away the emergence of  autonomous political tactics on the basis of  the historical 
cycles and crises of  the capitalist world system, and in general a reduction of  the political or 
interventionist Marx of  The Communist Manifesto or The Civil War in France in favor of  
the more analytical or systemic Marx of  Capital, with or without the supplement of  the more 
subjectively based Grundrisse.  In any case, the perceived shift in the trajectory of  Badiou’s 
evaluation of  Marxism as a militant discourse is less radical than appears at first sight.  Even 
as he will differently come to interpret the sense or meaning of  the term “history,” Badiou in 
fact has always defended the thesis that politics—while necessarily anchored or rooted in his-
tory—cannot be inferred or deduced from history alone.  This is why all events of  politics are 
necessarily forced events.  In Theory of  the Subject, for example, Badiou attempts to devise 
a dialectical articulation between history and politics, mapped onto the dialectic of  produc-
tive masses and partisan class.  “Class, apprehended according to the dialectical division of  
its dialecticity, means partisan political action anchored in the productive historicity of  the 
masses,” he claims.  “The whole point is to know how all this works together, because it is this 
working-together that is class.  This entails nothing less than to make the rectifiable singular-
ity of  politics rise up in the real movement of  history.”3  It is true that Badiou subsequently 
comes to abandon this view of  the transitivity or, at the very least, the dialectical working-
together of  history and politics, or of  masses and classes, organized through partisan action. 
Thus, in Can Politics Be Thought?, intransitivity becomes the new key in determining the 
essence of  politics, which marks the point of  the real even for Marx’s own discourse, which 
only the Marxist critique of  political economy subsequently ended up fixating into a fiction. 
Yet this does not mean that Badiou from that moment onward will abandon Marx’s dialectic 
and forgo the category of  history altogether.  As recently as in The Rebirth of  History, in fact, 
he revisits much of  the same grammar for the articulation in question, but now the history in 
which all politics is said to be “anchored” or “rooted” no longer refers to objective factors but 
instead becomes wholly internal to the subjective process of  sustaining a political event as 
such.  For the post-Marxist or post-Maoist in Badiou, the point is no longer to politicize his-
tory but to historicize politics.  If  there is a rebirth or reawakening of  history, it is no longer 
based in the objective history of  the class struggle but in the becoming-historical of  certain 
 3 Alain Badiou, Theory of  the Subject, trans. and intro.  Bruno Bosteels (London: Continuum, 2009), 
27.  For a more detailed analysis of  Badiou’s changing relationship to Marxism, see my “The 
Fate of  the Generic: Marx with Badiou,” in (Mis)readings of  Marx in Contemporary Continental 
Philosophy, ed. Jessica Whyte and Jernej Habjan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 211–226.
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spontaneous revolts and uprisings and in the making-political of  those historical riots.  In 
other words, all there is to the dialectic, if  this is still what we want to call the theory of  the 
event, is an immanent periodization of  spontaneous riot, historical movement, and political 
organization.  And so the new version of  the old question asked in Theory of  the Subject in 
terms of  masses, classes, and party, becomes the following in The Rebirth of  History: “How 
are we to inscribe politically, as active materiality under the sign of  the Idea, a reawaken-
ing of  History?” particularly if  such inscriptions are no longer socially predetermined but 
instead both rare and contingent: “Let us simply note that if  every political truth is rooted in 
a massive popular event, it nevertheless cannot be said that it is reducible to it.”4
10
Within French theory and even beyond national boundaries, the shift between structur-
alism and poststructuralism marks a pivotal turning point in the broader process of  prob-
lematizing the question of  political subjectivity.  As stated earlier, we can distinguish two 
dominant trends in this context: one still connected to Marxism and the dialectic, for which 
politics is inseparable from a process of  subjectivization; and the other very much aimed 
against the Hegelo-Marxist dialectic in the name of  difference, for which the subject remains 
irreparably metaphysical.  If  in the latter tendency, associated with the legacy of  Heidegger’s 
thinking, the most we obtain is an intimation of  an ontology of  “being-with” as the basis 
for an inoperative “community,” then in the former tendency, associated with the legacy of  
Althusser’s canonical works, the argument in favor of  the political subject is frequently for-
mulated in terms of  a plea in favor of  maintaining the category of  “the people.”  In their 
contributions to the collective volume What Is a People?, for example, Badiou and Rancière 
thus argue that “the people” in the singular, at least when it is severed from any particular-
ist inscription that would be signaled by an adjective accompanying the noun, can continue 
to serve as the name for the political subject today: “The word ‘people’ has a positive sense 
only with regard to the possible nonexistence of  the state.  Either the forbidden state whose 
creation is desired.  Or the official state whose disappearance is desired.  The ‘people’ is a 
word that takes all its value either, in transitory forms, from the wars of  national liberation 
or, in definitive forms, from communist politics.”5  But in the same vein we could also locate 
the theoretical orientation of  another ex-Althusserian, the late Ernesto Laclau, who similarly 
 4 Alain Badiou, The Rebirth of  History: Times of  Riots and Uprisings, trans. Gregory Elliott 
(London: Verso, 2012), 67 and 89.  For Badiou’s changing views of  history and politics, see also 
Chapters 3 and 7 in my Badiou and Politics.
 5 Alain Badiou, “Vingt-quatre notes sur les usages du mot ‘peuple,’” in Qu’est-ce qu’un peuple? 
(Paris: La Fabrique, 2013), 21.
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argues that the logic of  populism describes the essence of  all political processes.  These 
arguments then raise the question of  what happens when “peoples” appear in the plural 
and not in the singular, as in the expression “we, the people” that Judith Butler projects onto 
recent events worldwide, as if  the expression did not belong to a narrowly defined constitu-
tional tradition based in the United States.  On the contrary, the pluralization of  this possible 
name for the political subject today entails some reference or other to the racial, ethnic, and 
civilizational diversity of  “indigenous peoples,” “first nations,” or pueblos originarios.  “The 
universe of  meaning in which the notion of  people is deployed and takes on specific mean-
ings is generally constructed upon the articulation, never identical, of  three other notions: the 
nation, the citizenship/sovereignty, and the classes that we call subordinate,” as Sadri Khiari 
postulates in his contribution to What Is A People?  He adds: “To complete this description, 
we can mention the case in which the people, even while giving itself  the same foundations as 
the nation, self-identifies as ‘less’ than the nation, generally in that, even while being attached 
to certain autonomous powers, particularly on the cultural plane, it does not aspire to (or 
renounce) granting itself  a state that would be its own (we can mention in this regard the 
many ‘minority peoples’ in the European states).”6  This plural reference is rarely, if  ever, 
taken into account in what remains a fairly Eurocentric discussion regarding the names of  
the political subject today.  But if  we want to understand processes such as the classical ten-
sion between proletarians and peasants in Mao’s Cultural Revolution, the agrarian reforms of  
the Mexican or Cuban Revolutions, or the new plurinational constitution in Bolivia, we can-
not continue to remain blind to the question of  the “motley” or abigarrado nature of  political 
subjects today.
11
In any case, a new consensus has emerged in dialogue with the Althusserian school, 
in which not only Rancière or Balibar but also Badiou or Laclau can be inscribed, as well 
as a series of  younger thinkers whom one would not immediately or exclusively associate 
with Althusser such as Slavoj Žižek, Judith Butler, or Sandro Mezzadra.  The shared prem-
ise behind this consensus holds that subject and structure can be articulated through the 
essential incompleteness of  the latter–an incompleteness that would not be visible, however, 
without an intervention of  the former.  This is why, in the words of  Balibar, all good struc-
turalism is already poststructuralism: “But my hypothesis is precisely that there is, in fact, 
no such thing as poststructuralism, or rather that poststructuralism (which acquired this 
 6 Sadri Khiari, “Le peuple et le tiers-peuple” in Qu’est-ce qu’un peuple? (Paris: La Fabrique, 2013), 
117–118.  See also my introduction, “This People Which Is Not One,” to the forthcoming English 
translation of  What Is A People? (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016).
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name in the course of  its international ‘exportation,’ ‘reception,’ or ‘translation’) is always 
still structuralism, and structuralism in its strongest sense is already poststructuralism.”7 
The crucial point not to be missed in this context is not only that every structure is always 
already dislocated from within, marked by a necessary gap or discrepancy that keeps it 
from constituting a self-contained totality, which is after all the lesson to be learned from the 
canonical Althusser himself, who on this topic is in perfect agreement with Heideggerians 
such as Derrida, but also, and above all, that this gap or discrepancy does not appear unless 
there is an intervening subject at work on this very site, the site of  an event where the histo-
ricity of  the situation is symptomatically concentrated.  Such is the major theoretical innova-
tion introduced in common by a number of  thinkers working in the aftermath of  Althusser’s 
Marxism, Derridean deconstruction, Lacanian psychoanalysis, and Italian autonomy.  To use 
the excellent summary offered by Laclau in his preface to one of  Žižek’s first major books, 
The Sublime Object of  Ideology: “There is a subject because the substance—objectivity—
does not succeed in constituting itself  completely.”8
12
The problem with this new consensus is that the resulting theory of  the subject, articu-
lated onto the gap or incompleteness of  the structure, has once again become ontologized 
as a new law.  Just as Althusser, in his canonical writings from For Marx, turned the law of  
uneven development into a “primitive law,” applicable to any structure whatsoever, regard-
less of  historical circumstances such as the clash of  civilizations or the peripheral nature of  
certain countries such as Russia, so too in countless formulations flowing from the pen of  
Žižek, Butler, or Mezzadra, we now are told that the subject always exceeds its own deter-
mination by the power structures that nonetheless bring it into existence in the first place. 
“Agency exceeds the power by which it is enabled,” Butler postulates as though this were an 
irrevocable law of  subjectivity as such.  “If  the subject is neither fully determined by power 
nor fully determining of  power (but significantly and partially both), the subject exceeds the 
logic of  noncontradiction, is an excrescence of  logic, as it were.”9  Furthermore, in the name 
of  this necessary excess, which opens up the structure to its own radical contingency while 
 7 Étienne Balibar, “Structuralism: A Destitution of  the Subject?” trans. James Swenson, Differences: 
A Journal of  Feminist Cultural Studies 14:1 (2003): 11.
 8 Ernesto Laclau, “Preface,” in Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of  Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), 
xv.
 9 Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of  Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1997), 15 and 17.  See also Chapter 2, “Producción de subjetividad,” in Sandro Mezzadra, La 
cocina de Marx: El sujeto y su producción, trad. Diego Picotto (Buenos Aires: Tinta Limón, 2014), 
23–33.
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at the same time inscribing the subject in the space of  this opening, contemporary theory 
also frequently follows in the footsteps of  Althusser himself  who in his posthumous writings 
went in search of  an eclectic form of  “aleatory materialism,” supposedly capable of  bypass-
ing the alleged determinism of  his own earlier materialist dialectic in whose name he had 
first begun to articulate some of  the same principles in his canonical writings.
13
If, in the words of  Yoshihiko Ichida, there exists something like a dominant political 
anthropology, or a new fundamental ontology today, then it is this consensus, which gives 
a new twist to Hegel’s dictum that spirit must be thought “not only as substance but also as 
subject.”10  Žižek, of  course, is the philosopher who has gone the farthest in proudly affirm-
ing the Hegelian credentials behind this new consensus, which in his eyes breaks definitively 
with the textbook versions of  deconstruction that claim to have overcome the totalizing drive 
of  the dialectic toward the Absolute.  But even when the presence of  Hegel is less mind-
numbingly obvious than in the case of  Žižek, we can find similar assumptions about the 
articulation of  substance and subject among a great many other authors in contemporary 
theory.  In this sense, our current situation in terms of  theory is overwhelmingly controlled 
by the persistent paradigm of  German idealism.
14
Any attempt to break with the paradigm of  the theory of  the subject inherited–after 
the necessary deconstruction of  its metaphysical underpinnings in terms of  the principle 
of  totality–from German idealism, for this very reason, sees itself  confronted with the same 
alternative voiced in the title of  another one of  Althusser’s disciples, that is, the title of  Pierre 
Macherey’s book Hegel or Spinoza.  In fact, continuing in the footsteps of  the posthumous 
Althusser, many authors find unsuspected allies for this effort in other pre-Hegelian or even 
pre-Kantian thinkers, aside from Spinoza: thinkers such as Machiavelli, if  not much earlier, 
ancient materialists such as Lucretius.  Finally, like the radical outcome of  the Heideggerian 
path of  thinking, such efforts also frequently end up sacrificing the theory of  the subject alto-
gether, but now they do so in the name of  an ontological affirmation of  radical immanence, 
contingency, and the objective–rather than subjective–freedom of  the aleatory.




More so than a reshuffling of  the familiar deck of  philosophical cards, the current 
impasse in the theory of  politics and subjectivity requires a two-fold historicization.  Not 
only should we expand on the notion (originally proposed by one of  Badiou’s friends and 
fellow militants, Sylvain Lazarus) of  “historical modes of  politics,” including among others 
the Jacobin, Bolshevik, Stalinist and democratic-parliamentary modes, which would at least 
begin to account for the fact that certain modes of  doing politics, such as the class-based 
politics of  communist parties and unions all over the world, may have been appropriate in 
the past, even if  they have become obsolete or saturated today.  But, in addition, we should 
also historicize the different “theories of  the subject,” in the plural, from which the new post-
Hegelian consensus has been able to emerge uncontested by consolidating itself  as if  it were 
the only theory of  the subject that ever existed (as when Badiou himself  writes, precisely in 
Theory of  the Subject: “The truth is that there is only one theory of  the subject”11).
16
In terms of  the first historicization, we might want to consider the fact that long before 
the multiple events of  Tahrir Square, the indignados of  Puerta del Sol in Spain, or Occupy 
Wall Street in the USA, the current sequence of  riots and uprisings may have taken off  
in 2006 in Mexico with the so-called Oaxaca Commune, which in turn inspired activists in 
California to baptize themselves the Oakland Commune rather than Occupy Oakland.  This 
name, however, should not too quickly be interpreted only as a reference to the heroic exam-
ple of  the 1871 Paris Commune, so frequently invoked by the likes of  Badiou and others.  As 
even Marx knew all too well, even though he momentarily seems to forget this in his analysis 
of  the Paris Commune in The Civil War in France, there exists a longstanding tradition of  
comunero revolts in the Hispanic world that goes far back at least to the sixteenth century, 
with the rebellion of  comuneros of  Castile, through various eighteenth-century indigenous 
uprisings in the Andes and New Granada, all the way to what the Trotskyist historian Adolfo 
Gilly describes as the Commune of  Morelos of  1914–1915, in a year-long experiment in radi-
cal land reform and military self-government among the original Zapatistas just south of  
Mexico City.  The commune thus intermittently appears as a historical mode of  political 
action and organization that seems particularly apt in moments of  quasi-anarchist autonomy 
from the centralized state, with the fusion of  peasants and proletarians in particular being a 
key mobilizing element in the context of  Latin America.  But this also brings back the ques-
tion of  the community in a way that can no longer be reduced to the ontological register and 
 11 Badiou, Theory of  the Subject, 115.
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instead calls for an investigation into the historical fate of  so-called primitive or originary 
communities in the buildup of  various political forms of  the commune.
17
Similar questions must come to frame the second task of  historicization, in terms of  
various theories of  the subject aside from the dominant version inherited from German ide-
alism.  If  today, for example, the new consensus has established the version in which the 
subject appears split by the incompleteness of  the structure, then we must still come to an 
understanding of  how this version became, as it were, ontologized as the only theory of  the 
subject, valid for all times.  For all the emphasis on the contingency of  the event, this evental 
theory nevertheless remains through and through ahistorical and transcendental.  There is 
then always only one theory of  how any subject whatsoever intervenes in fidelity to the event 
but there are no events–such as the advent of  Christianity or the globalization of  capitalism 
with the conquest of  the Americas–that would come to mark different types or figures of  
the subject.  By contrast, if  we want to take them into account, such types or figures call for 
a theory of  the subject that would no longer be structural or transcendental but rather his-
torical or genealogical along the lines of  the recent work of  Alain de Libéra, in his multivol-
ume Archaeology of  the Subject or that of  the recently deceased Argentine philosopher León 
Rozitchner, on the historical links between capitalism and Christian subjectivity.
18
Marx’s thought can still be helpful in this context.  Even in the Grundrisse, whose the 
subject-oriented approach inspired Antonio Negri’s lessons given for Althusser’s seminar in 
France and subsequently published as Marx Beyond Marx, we do well to focus not just on 
the 1857 Einleitung or on the so-called “fragment on the machine” from which all Italian 
autonomists and post-autonomists took their inspiration, but also on the central section on 
“Economic Forms that Precede Capitalism,” which was edited in English as a separate book-
let by Eric Hobsbawn and, particularly in peripheral or postcolonial contexts such as in Latin 
America, went through numerous reprintings as one of  the fundamental texts in the Marxist 
corpus.  What this section highlights is the need to raise anew the question of  the historical 
emergence of  capitalism out of  the fortuitous encounter of  factors that are themselves not 
capitalist but that subsequently come to be recoded and circularly reinscribed into the impos-
sible loop of  capital, as though they had been the result of  capital itself.  It is in large part due 
to such an impossible looping mechanism that the so-called primitive, agrarian or peasant 
communes or communities that preceded the movement of  originary accumulation appear 
as being forever lost, so that the various uprisings and revolts, which for this reason often 
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adopt the name of  the commune, claim to operate in the name of  their utopian return.  Such 
a utopian dream is not just the result of  a retrospective illusion, to be dispelled through the 
adoption of  an ontological community that is always already constitutively lost; it is also an 
inevitable aspect of  any political initiative that seems to mobilize a collective subject there 
where previously only atomistic individualities seemed to be available on the marketplace of  
civil-bourgeois society.
19
There nonetheless exists a strange analogy between the circular loop of  capital, as 
described in these central sections of  the Grundrisse, and the very structure of  revolutionary 
praxis, which is defined in the third of  Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach” as the “coincidence” 
or, literally, the “falling together” of  the changing of  one’s circumstances and self-change, 
that is to say, the simultaneous transformation of  the structure and of  the subject: “Das 
Zusammenfallen des Änderns der Umstände und der menschlichen Tätigkeit kann nur als 
umwälzende Praxis gefasst und rationell verstanden werden” (“The coincidence of  the chang-
ing of  circumstances and of  human activity or self-change can be conceived and rationally 
understood only as revolutionary praxis”12).  Even or especially when this thesis is translated 
in terms of  the dominant post-Hegelian consensus, the fact remains that the notion according 
to which a subject, though determined by circumstances that are not of  its own making, can 
simultaneously transform both itself  and its own circumstances, offers an uncanny replica 
of  the loop whereby capital seems to posit the effective presuppositions of  its own emergence 
as though they were the products of  its own doing.  A sustained engagement with Marx’s 
theories of  the subject, which obviously cannot be undertaken here, should thus be able to 
contribute in a fundamental way to what must be described as a second-order historiciza-
tion, that is, the historicization of  the becoming-transcendental or ahistorical of  the political 
anthropology inherited from German idealism.  Such an undertaking might be able to shed 
new light on the fact that even the most radical calls for the revolutionary overthrow of  
capitalism seem to continue to rely on a very peculiar theory of  the subject, which only in 
the modern era has been able to present itself  as universally and eternally valid.  This is not 
to say that we suffer only from the philosophical influence of  German idealism but rather 
that the rise of  German idealism itself  is part of  a broader historical process in which our 
understanding of  subjectivity seems to have been modeled upon the self-change or activity 
of  capitalism.
 12 Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” Collected Works (London: International Publishers, 1975), 
vol. 5, 4.
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20
A thorough materialist historicization of  the becoming-ahistorical of  the dominant–
evental but still transcendental–theory of  the subject today cannot afford to obliterate the 
historical markers that might separate a Christian from a pre-Christian understanding of  the 
self, or a capitalist from a pre-capitalist understanding of  human speech and thought.  This 
does not mean, however, that we should opt instead for a position of  historical relativism 
according to which every culture from every epoch would have a theory of  the subject of  its 
own.  If  we still wish to argue that the subject has always existed, we might want to add that 
it did not always exist in the same subjective form.  The subject is not an invention of  the phi-
losophers, be they Descartes or Hegel, perhaps preceded along this path by Saint Augustine. 
If  the subject is quintessentially modern, to the point where any theory of  the subject can 
be said to involve an implicit theory of  modernity, then we must come to an understanding 
of  how such a modern subject was able to project itself  on the basis of  pre-modern circum-
stances that it did not create but rather found before it as so many effective or historical pre-
suppositions.  In other words, the break between the subject and that which is not the subject 
(the materials on which the subject operates, whatever they are called: nature, desire, will 
power, life or simply certain quanta of  force and drive) must be interrogated in tandem with 
the break between the modern and the pre-modern, or between capitalist and pre-capitalist 
economic but also subjective (psychic, libidinal, cognitive, and affective) formations.  Only 
then will it be possible to escape the conundrum in which any call for the transformation of  
the world, no matter how rabidly and violently anticapitalist in tone, continues to replicate 
the impossible loop whereby capital, like an eternal Münchhausen pulling himself  up from 
his own hair, sustains the illusion that it is capable of  producing everything, even the histori-
cal presuppositions of  its own emergence.  Put differently, only then will we be able to stop 
thinking and acting like capitalist subjects.
Mexico City-Kyoto, January 2015
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